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Introduction
There is a growing policy interest in reducing water 
use in agriculture when this generates sufficiently large 
environmental benefits. The application of the EU Water 
Framework Directive (WFD) has fostered an increasing 
number of economic analyses to investigate farmers’ 
behavior by means of mathematical programming tech-
niques (Berbel and Gómez-Limón, 2000; Garrido et al., 
2003; Bartolini et al., 2005; Pujol et al., 2006) including 
Positive Mathematical Programming (PMP) models 
(Blanco et al., 2004; Iglesias and Blanco, 2008; Cortig-
nani and Severini, 2009). These models have been used 
to evaluate the impact of likely increases of water pay-
ments that the application of the WFD is expected to 
cause on groups of farms in terms of their cropping pat-
terns, water use and economic results.
Despite their increasing popularity in economic 
analysis, traditional PMP models generally fail to include 
activities that were not observed in the reference period. 
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Abstract
The growing policy pressure to reduce water use could lead to the introduction of environmental payments granted on the 
basis of the amount of water farmers save. This paper proposes an extension of the PMP Röhm and Dabbert approach in 
order to consider deficit irrigation crop techniques which are not observed in the reference period. The proposed methodol-
ogy is applied to an Italian irrigated area to evaluate the likely impact of such environmental payments on water use, cropping 
patterns, adoption of deficit irrigation techniques and economic results on farms. The analysis shows that the considered 
payments induce farmers to reduce water use, to adopt deficit irrigation techniques and increase economic results. This latter 
result occurs because the payments counterbalance the negative impact caused by the reduction of water use.
Additional key words: agro-environmental payments; deficit irrigation techniques; farmers’ behaviour; positive 
mathematical programming; water saving policies.
Resumen
Un modelo de PMP extendido para analizar la adopción de técnicas de riego deficitario bajo pagos ambientales
La creciente presión de la opinión pública para reducir el uso del agua podría llevar a introducir pagos medioam-
bientales basados en la cantidad de agua que el agricultor ahorra. Este artículo propone una extensión del modelo PMP 
Röhm y Dabbert para incluir en este varias técnicas de déficit de riego, las cuales no han sido observadas en el perio-
do de referencia. Se ha aplicado la metodología propuesta a un area irrigada de Italia, para evaluar el posible impacto 
de estos pagos ambientales en el uso de agua, modelos de cultivo, adopción de técnicas de déficit de riego, así como 
en los resultados económicos. El análisis muestra que los pagos considerados inducen a los agricultores a reducir el 
uso del agua, a adoptar técnicas de déficit de riego y aumentan los resultados económicos. Este último resultado ocu-
rre porque los pagos superan el impacto negativo causado por la reducción del uso del agua.
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This can be limiting in the sector of water policy because, 
under the pressure of new market and policy conditions, 
farmers may adjust not only their cropping patterns but 
also the amount of water per hectare they use.
Irrigated agriculture in Europe is currently adapting 
to new environmental and policy conditions. On one 
hand, water available for irrigation is expected to de-
crease in many areas of the world because climate 
change is causing an increase in temperatures and a 
decrease in rainfall (Farrè and Faci, 2009) and because 
there is a growing competition for water use generated 
by non-farm users and by the growing demand for 
environmental services (Blanco et al., 2004). This is 
generating a growing policy pressure to increase water 
costs and to reduce water use also in agriculture. The 
WFD, in order to promote sustainable water use based 
on a long-term protection of available water resources, 
asks Member States to take account of the principle of 
recovery of the costs of water services, including en-
vironmental and resource costs. The application of this 
principle is expected to increase the water cost Italian 
farmers are going to pay in the future. This is because 
currently Italian farmers are charged by Irrigation 
Boards only for the operational variable costs (i.e. not 
the infrastructure fixed costs) for the service of deliver-
ing the water to the farmers. 
On the other hand, the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) is under scrutiny to develop a policy for the 
years following 2013 that generates larger social ben-
efits and justifies public spending in a better way. The 
recent Health Check reform of the CAP has channeled 
financial resources to the so called “new Challenges” 
one of which specifically refers to water management 
in agriculture (EC, 2009b). Because of the growing 
emphasis on this objective and the financial resources 
available for this area to be used also in Rural Develop-
ment Policies, it is likely that agro-environmental 
policy could accommodate for some payments granted 
on the basis of the amount of water farmers save. In-
deed, agro-environmental payments have been tradi-
tionally judged as a useful tool to promote the produc-
tion of environmental services and, in the meantime, 
to support farm income.
New techniques with low irrigation water require-
ments could play a key role in this scenario. In par-
ticular, Deficit Irrigation (DI) is said to provide a way 
to reduce water use in agriculture because it allows a 
crop to sustain some degree of water deficit in order to 
better use the overall available water, to reduce irriga-
tion costs and, potentially, to increase farm income 
(Fereres and Soriano, 2007). The potential benefits of 
introducing DI derive from three factors: increased 
irrigation efficiency, reduced irrigation and water op-
portunity costs (English and Raja, 1996). 
As farmers have the option of deciding whether or 
not to adopt DI, it is important for the research agenda 
to focus on models that represent farmers’ behavior 
under the new expected conditions. In fact, this kind 
of analysis sheds light on whether DI can satisfy water 
saving objectives with limited negative implications 
on farmers’ income.
In recent years, PMP has been increasingly used in 
farm-level economic analyses. This approach requires 
a relatively limited amount of data and allows calibrat-
ing models perfectly to the reference period on the basis 
of the assumptions discussed below. However, because 
PMP models generally fail to represent activities that 
were not observed in the reference period, there have 
been some attempts to include these activities to allow 
for more flexibility in model responses (Paris and Ar-
fini, 2000; Blanco et al., 2008; Iglesias and Blanco, 
2008). Not taking these activities into consideration is 
a shortcoming in the specific field of irrigation analysis 
because, when for example water availability decreas-
es or water costs increase, farmers may find it conven-
ient to introduce DI techniques that were not profitable 
previously and were not observed under baseline condi-
tions (Lezoche and Severini, 2007). 
This paper proposes an extension of the PMP (Röhm 
and Dabbert, 2003) approach in order to include deficit 
irrigation (DI) crop techniques not observed during the 
reference period in the models. These alternative tech-
niques, identified by means of a crop growth model 
developed by the FAO (Clarke et al., 1998), are in-
cluded by using a method recently proposed by Cor-
tignani and Severini (2009). The proposed methodol-
ogy is applied to an irrigated area of Italy to evaluate 
the likely impact of environmental payments granted 
on the basis of the amount of water farmers save, crop-
ping patterns, adoption of deficit irrigation techniques 
and farm economic results.
Material and methods
PMP: standard and Röhm and Dabbert 
approaches
The PMP methodology, developed to calibrate 
agricultural supply models (Arfini and Paris, 1995; 
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Howitt, 1995; Heckelei and Britz, 2005), assumes a 
profit-maximizing equilibrium in the reference pe-
riod. It recovers additional information from ob-
served activity levels in order to specify a non-lin-
ear objective function so that the resulting non-linear 
model reproduces the observed situation in the base 
year.
The standard approach (Arfini and Paris, 1995) in-
volves three steps: 1) Specification of a linear program-
ming model bound to the observed activity levels by 
calibration constraints, in order to obtain the addi-
tional marginal variable costs for these activities; 
2) Estimation of a quadratic variable cost function as-
sumed to capture all farming conditions not modeled 
in an explicit way; and 3) The formulation of a quad-
ratic programming model including the variable cost 
function in the objective function. This model repro-
duces the behavior observed in the base year exactly 
and can be used to perform simulations on several 
parameters of the model, including product and factor 
prices, subsidies and resource availability. The variable 
cost function is assumed to be quadratic because this 
form is relatively easy to work with and has the desir-
able property of increasing marginal cost functions for 
each activity, apart from the marginal (least profitable) 
activity.
Denoting the crops by j, the quadratic programming 
model can be compactly written as:
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where Z denotes the objective function value; xj repre-
sents the production activity levels (hectares allocated 
to crop j); rj denotes average revenue per unit of activ-
ity; ai,j represents the scalar element of a matrix of 
coefficients in the resource/policy constraints (index 
i); bi is the vector of available resource quantities; 
ACj(xj) denotes average variable cost function per unit 
of activity and has the following form: 
 AC x xj j j j j( ) = +α β12  [2]
where α and β are parameters to be estimated.
Multiple sets of cost function parameters satisfy the 
first order conditions of the problem [1]. One of the 
options for recovering these parameters is the follow-
ing (Arfini and Paris, 1995):
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where cj are the observed accounting costs and µj are 
the additional marginal variable costs. These latter 
values are recovered by means of the following calibra-
tion constraints included in the linear programming 
model of the first step of PMP:
 x xj j j≤ +( )  0 1 ε µ  [4]
where x0j are the observed variable levels and ε is a 
small positive number (Howitt, 1995).
In the standard approach, the parameters of the cost 
function are recovered for each land-use activity sepa-
rately. In this way, different production technologies 
for the same crop (variants) are taken as separate ac-
tivities. Therefore, it is not considered that a large 
substitution among these variants could occur in the 
simulation phase, because they have similar technical-
agronomic characteristics. Indeed, variants generally 
refer to different ways of producing the same crop 
product and they differ only in terms of the amount of 
used production factors (e.g. amount of fertilizers and 
water, irrigation technologies, crop protection tech-
nologies) and yield. Therefore, farmers can be ex-
pected to adjust cropping technologies more easily (i.e. 
switching from one variant to another of the same crop) 
than cropping mix (i.e. switching from one crop to 
another).
Röhm and Dabbert (2003) propose a different mod-
eling approach to account for the fact that the elastic-
ity of substitution is expected to be higher between 
variants of the same crops than between different crops. 
Denoting the crops by j and the variants by v, the quad-
ratic programming model can be written as:
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where average variable costs per unit of activity (ACj,v) 
are defined as:
 AC x x xj v j v j v j v j v j v j v, , , , , ,( ) = + + ∑α β γ12 12   [6]
The Röhm and Dabbert approach (2003) introduces 
an additional slope parameter (γ) not included in [2] 
which is common to all variants of the same crop. 
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Therefore, there are two sets of slope parameters, one 
for each crop (γ) and another for each variant of the 
same crop (β).
As for the standard approach, multiple sets of cost 
function parameters satisfy the first order conditions. 
One option to recover these parameters is1:
 α β µ γ µj v j v j v j v
j v
j
j
v j v
c
x x, , ,
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; ;= = = ∑0 0  [7]
where cj,v are the accounting costs. The other parame-
ters can be recovered on the basis of the results of the 
original linear problem of the first step of PMP with 
two sets of additional calibration constraints:
 ∑ ≤ ∑ +( )  v j v v j v jx x, ,0 11 ε µ  [8]
 x xj v j v j v, , ,≤ +( )  0 21 ε µ  [9]
where ε1 and ε2 are small positive numbers (ε1 < ε2); µj 
are the additional marginal variable costs associated 
with crops; and µj,v are the additional marginal variable 
costs associated with crop variants. 
In our analysis, we recover the cost function param-
eters under quite unfavorable conditions. We have only 
one observation (i.e. the vector of cropping patterns 
for each sub-area), a set of yield and economic param-
eters to estimate the average gross margins for each 
cropping activity, estimates of irrigation water require-
ment for each crop and no prior information other than 
land rental value. This latter is used to obtain an in-
creasing marginal cost function also for the marginal 
activity using the approach developed by Gohin and 
Chantreuil (1999). Indeed, in the standard approach 
the µ dual value referring to the marginal activity van-
ishes and consequently the β slope coefficient is equal 
to zero. Setting the dual value for the land constraint 
equal to the observed land rental value, the µ dual value 
for the marginal activity becomes greater than zero and 
it is possible to recover a non-zero β slope coefficient 
also for this activity.
The proposed PMP approach 
The method proposed here is an extension of the 
Röhm and Dabbert approach (2003) with the cost pa-
rameter defined according to the calibration method of 
Arfini and Paris (1995). This allows for the considera-
tion of activities that are not present in the reference 
year. 
For some of the observed irrigated crops, there are 
different irrigation techniques (crop variants v): full 
and DI techniques. The first is observed in the reference 
period while the DI techniques are not. 
In contrast to [8] and [9], the calibration constraints 
are specified as: 
 ∑ ≤ ∑ +( ) +  v j v v j v jx x, ,0 1 31 ε ε µ  [10]
 x xj v j v j v, , ,≤ +( ) +  0 2 31 ε ε µ  [11]
where ε3 is a sufficiently small positive number (ε1 < ε2 
< ε3). In fact, considering that some variants are equal 
to zero, an additive small positive number (ε3) must be 
specified for the variants not observed (in this case the 
DI techniques) in order to recover non zero dual values 
(μ) in all cases. 
Having recovered the additional marginal variable 
cost parameters, the average cost functions are specified 
as:
AC x x xj v j v j v j v j v j v j v j v, , , , , , ,( ) = + + ∑ +α β γ ϑ12 12  [12]
The parameters of the cost function are recovered 
as:
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where ϑj,v are linear cost parameters that consider the 
relative weight of variant v within the crop j. This 
method of recovering the cost parameters satisfies the 
first order conditions of the considered problem. The 
parameter ϑj,v is relatively large when the variant is 
cultivated on a limited share of the whole crop j area. 
Also Paris and Arfini (2000), Blanco et al. (2008) 
and Iglesias and Blanco (2008) use another linear pa-
rameter to capture differences between single farms or 
site-specific characteristics by inference from data for 
similar farms or farms in the same location.
However, in contrast with the original approach, our 
method allows the recovery of a β slope coefficient 
1 The expressions [7] are an extension of the calibration method of Arfini and Paris (1995) considering the Röhm and Dabbert 
approach (2003).
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even when the variant is not observed in the reference 
period. In particular, parameters β are calculated by 
means of the whole crop j area and, as a result, they 
are not influenced by the area of each specific variant. 
This prevents the variants of the same crops having 
very different slopes when they are cultivated at dif-
ferent levels. This is a desirable property because, as 
variants of the same crop, they have similar technical 
– agronomic characteristics and their marginal costs 
are expected to be relatively similar. Further differ-
ences between variants are captured by the linear pa-
rameter of the cost function (ϑj,v) that does not depend 
on the production level. This occurs because ϑj,v consid-
ers the relative importance of variant v within the crop 
j and the recovered βj,v slope takes into account the 
specific economic characteristics of the considered 
variant.
The empirical model
The empirical model has been developed using data 
from the agricultural area served by the Irrigation Board 
(IB) “Maremma Etrusca” located in Central Italy, about 
80 kms north of Rome. There are approximately 1,000 
farms in this area covering about 8,000 ha of land, more 
than one-third of which is irrigated (Table 1). Water is 
obtained from a river that originates from lake Bolsena 
where considerable recreational activities occur during 
the summer (e.g. swimming, boating and fishing). The 
water outflow is reduced in this period in those years 
characterized by limited rain flow to ensure that the 
water level of the lake is kept high enough to allow for 
these activities. When this occurs, water availability 
for downstream farmers becomes limited during the 
summer. Water availability for the farming sector is 
expected to decrease in the future due to a decline in 
the importance of farming and the growing demand for 
water for the tourism sector.
Water cost is charged to farmers by multiplying 
water use by an average unitary water distribution cost 
coefficient (€ m–3) (Table 1). The IB calculates it at the 
end of the irrigation season by dividing water distribu-
tion cost by the amount of water distributed in each 
sub-area. This value is very low because it accounts 
only for the variable cost of water distribution incurred 
by the IB. It does not account for the financial cost of 
the infrastructures managed by the IB, nor for the op-
portunity and environmental costs of this resource. This 
clearly conflicts with the aim of the WFD that requires 
Table 1. Cropping patterns, economic data and main characteristics of the study area and sub-areas L1, L2 and L31 (2004)
Cropping activity
Observed activity levels (ha) Unitary 
irrigation 
requirements
(m3 ha–1)
Prices
(€ ton–1)
Yield
(ton ha–1)
Variable specific costs
L1 L2 L3 Total Water
(€ ha–1)
Other 
factors2
(€ ha–1)
Durum wheat 1,421 1,351 1,934 4,706   – 140  4.0   – 601
Soft wheat  39   –   –  39   – 120  5.0   – 520
Barley   –  35   –  35   – 120  4.1   – 450
Maize  38  37  99 174   3,430 170 11.0 313   1,132
Asparagus   4   8   8  20   2,367 2,200  3.5 225   1,600
Artichokes  21  30  57 108   1,685 979  7.0 154   1,511
Cabbage   6   1   1   8 790 250 14.0  72   1,253
Sugar beets   9  26  11  46   2,609  43 70.0 238   1,315
Tomatoes 193 384 437 1,014   2,720  47 80.0 249   2,680
Melons  69  60  76 205   2,200 250 25.0 201   2,152
Watermelons 113 117 100 330   2,460 170 35.5 225   1,670
Fennel  89 150 186 425   2,050 350 29.0 187   1,256
Other crops 319 171 397 887   –    –    –   –     –
Utilized agricultural area (ha) 2,321 2,370 3,306 7,997
Irrigated land (ha) 578 829 1,005 2,412
Water use (1000 m3) 1,416 2,056 2,553 6,026
Average water cost (€ m–3) 0.07 0.12 0.12
1 The irrigation board delivers water using three non-fully connected irrigation systems, which we distinguish as sub-areas L1, L2 and L3. 
Each sub-area is represented as a separate entity made up of the sum of all farms located in that section of the study area. 2 Excluding labour.
R. Cortignani and S. Severini / Span J Agric Res (2011) 9(4), 1035-10461040
charging water costs accounting also for these latter 
cost categories. This makes the application of the prin-
ciples of the WFD to likely increase the unitary water 
costs farmers will face in the future.
The IB delivers water using three non-fully con-
nected irrigation systems, which we distinguish as 
sub-areas L1, L2 and L3. These sub-areas are similar 
in terms of soil quality, farm size and production tech-
nologies. Data on cropped area, input use, variable 
costs per activity, expected product prices and yields 
by crop, water charges, irrigated area, water availabil-
ity and agricultural policy subsidies and constraints 
were collected and used in previous research (Cortig-
nani and Severini, 2004; Lezoche and Severini, 2007; 
Blanco et al., 2008; Cortignani and Severini, 2009). 
Each sub-area is represented in the model as a separate 
entity made up of the sum of all farms located in that 
section of the study area.
We calibrated the model to the pre-reform situation 
using 2004 cropland allocation data for 26 crops. Spe-
cifically, most of the land is allocated to durum wheat, 
but horticultural crops are also important, especially 
tomatoes for processing.
The structural constraints of the model refer to land 
and water. Land constraints account for both the total 
land and land used for permanent crops. Water con-
straints refer to the balance between crop requirements 
and water availability: these constraints apply to the 
annual balance and to three main irrigation periods: 
spring, summer and autumn. 
Given the low cost of water and the large annual 
availability of water, the amount of water distributed 
to farmers is generally large and only full irrigation 
techniques are used. However, under the new policy 
scenario considered in the simulations, DI could be-
come a profitable strategy for farmers. We included DI 
techniques in the model for the four main irrigated 
crops: watermelon (Citrullus lanatus [Thunb.]), maize 
(Zea mays L.), melon (Cucumis melo L.) and tomato 
(Solanum lycopersicum L.). Together, these account 
for about 71% of the total irrigated area. We have iden-
tified DI techniques using the agronomic model Crop-
Wat developed by the FAO. This model predicts, on 
the basis of climatic and agronomic data, the likely 
yield impacts of reducing irrigation water (Clarke et 
al., 1998). The impacts are based on a simplified water 
balance model that calculates the water requirements 
of each crop in each period. These are calculated as:
 CWR ETo Kc Area= ⋅ ⋅  [14]
where CWR indicates the global crop water require-
ment, Eto is the evapotranspiration level coefficient for 
the study area, Kc is a crop specific coefficient esti-
mated by the model developers on the basis of experi-
mental data and Area is the cropped area. Therefore, 
CWR depends also on climatic conditions, agronomic 
practices and soil characteristics (Doorenbos and Pruitt, 
1977; Doorenbos and Kassam, 1979). The data set for 
CWR in the study area was developed and analyzed by 
Lezoche and Severini (2007). 
The impact of water deficit on yields is calculated 
by CropWat on the basis of the following relationship:
 1 1−
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where Ya and Ym are actual and maximum yields, ETa and 
ETm are actual and maximum evapotranspiration and KY 
is a factor denoting the linkages between yield and eva-
potranspiration. This factor is crop specific and has been 
identified for each crop by the model developers. This 
relationship is estimated in the whole crop growing sea-
son considering the main crop growing periods (Dooren-
bos and Kassam, 1977).
The most important factor that relates evapotran-
spirated to applied water is irrigation efficiency, which 
depends on irrigation uniformity and the depth of ir-
rigation water applied. As a consequence, the relation-
ship between applied and evapotranspirated water is 
not generally linear (Reca et al., 2001).
Two DI techniques for each of the four crops have 
been identified under the assumption that those two 
techniques reduce irrigation levels by 5% (DI5) or 10% 
(DI10) with respect to the actual levels. These reductions 
are applied linearly to each irrigation without altering 
the irrigation calendar. This simplified approach is used 
here given the small considered reductions (5% and 
10%). However, a less simplified approach should be 
used in future research to explore such important as-
pects better. 
The considered water reductions do not severely 
affect yield levels. Furthermore, under the considered 
intervals, water volumes affect yield according to con-
stant or decreasing marginal productivity (Table 2). In 
the simulations that follow, these results have been used 
to identify the expected yields of DI techniques.
The variable crop specific cost reductions shown in 
Table 2 are affected only by the changes in the direct 
cost of irrigation. However, the reductions in applied 
water could cause reductions not only in the costs of 
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irrigation but also in other costs such as fertilizers and 
harvesting (English and Raja, 1996).
Regarding the simulations, the environmental pay-
ment is applied per cubic meter of saved water: this is 
calculated by subtracting the actual water use from the 
water use observed in the baseline.
Results
The model was calibrated to 2004 data on observed 
cropland allocation. We created a new base case to con-
sider important changes of the Common Agricultural 
Policy of the UE (CAP) introduced by the so called Mid-
term Review (MTR) of the 2003. In particular the new 
base case considers the decoupling of direct payments 
for cereal and other field crops (i.e. COP crops), the 
introduction of a partially coupled aid aimed at improv-
ing the quality of durum wheat and the modulation of 
direct aids as prescribed by Council Regulation (EC) No 
1782/2003 (EC, 2003). The conditions introduced by the 
MTR reform will be in effect at least until 2013. There-
fore, this is the new policy environment in which EU 
farmers will operate in the coming years. The MTR 
simulation is taken as the baseline from which the set of 
simulation regarding the introduction of environmental 
payments granted on the basis of the amount of water 
farmers save.
The simulations consider the introduction of an 
environment payment at different levels. These are set 
at € 0.10, 0.30 and 0.50 per saved cubic meter of 
water2. This last variable is calculated starting from the 
amount of water used in the MTR situation.
The environmental payment determines a small sav-
ing in water consumption if compared with the size of 
the payment. In fact, a payment of € 0.10 m–3 deter-
mines a saving of around 10% and a payment of 
€ 0.50 m–3 determines a reduction of around 33%. In 
general, increasing the environmental payment level 
does not cause a strong reduction in water use and this 
behavior clearly becomes stronger as the relative water 
saving increases (Figure 1). 
Indeed, after a certain level, further increases of the 
payment do not reduce water consumption. In the study 
area this phenomenon could occur only at very un-
likely high payment levels. 
As the environmental payment level increases, the 
amount of irrigated land decreases from 30% of UAA 
in the MTR baseline, to 27.5% with a payment of 
€ 0.10 m–3 and to 21% with a payment of € 0.50 m–3. 
Water use also declines while increasing the level of 
the environmental payment. However, the relative re-
duction of water use is generally higher in absolute 
terms than the reduction of irrigated area. In fact the 
reduction of water use is caused by a change in crop-
ping patterns and by the switching from full irrigation 
to DI technologies.
Regarding the cropping patterns, there is a reduction 
in irrigated crops and, in particular, of those crops with 
lower gross margin value (i.e. corn) (Table 3). The area 
devoted to vegetables with higher gross margin value 
also decreases but to a lesser extent (i.e. tomato, melon 
and watermelon). Irrigated crops are replaced by non-
irrigated crops, especially cereals such as durum wheat 
and oats. 
The introduction of environmental payments in-
duces farmers to switch to DI (Table 4). It is worth 
noting that in the 2004, DIs are not observed in the 
baseline, but they enter into production (even if in 
small quantities) while applying the MTR reform 
(Table 4). 
Table 2. Change in crop yields and specific variable costs for 
deficit irrigation technologies (DI5 and DI10) with respect to 
full irrigation technologies (% changes)
 Yields 
(%)
Specific variable costs1 (€ ha–1)
 L1 L2 L3
Watermelon:
    DI5 –2.07 –0.49 –0.64 –0.64
    DI10 –4.14 –0.98 –1.28 –1.28
Maize:
    DI5 –2.00 –0.92 –1.16 –1.16
    DI10 –4.12 –1.84 –2.32 –2.32
Melon:
    DI5 –2.00 –0.35 –0.46 –0.46
    DI10 –4.12 –0.70 –0.92 –0.92
Tomato:
    DI5 –1.89 –0.35 –0.46 –0.46
    DI10 –3.79 –0.70 –0.92 –0.92
1 They refer to all specific variable costs for each crop. The ir-
rigation board delivers water using three non-fully connected ir-
rigation systems, which we distinguish as sub-areas L1, L2 and 
L3. DI5 and DI10 refer to reductions of irrigation water of 5% and 
10% with respect to current full irrigation techniques.
2 These figures are rather high when compared with the unitary water cost currently charged by the IB. However, as already explained, 
the application of the WFD is expected to increase the cost farmers will pay.
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Without payments, DI is used only on 2.6% of 
the irrigated land, with a payment of € 0.10 m–3, 
around 8% of the considered crop area is cultivated 
using DI techniques. This percentage becomes about 
37% when the payment is set at € 0.50 m–3. Switch-
ing to DI techniques allows farmers to reduce the 
irrigated land proportionally less than the used 
water (Table 3).
The changes in cropping patterns and irrigation 
technologies generated by the introduction of the en-
vironmental payments have an impact on the eco-
nomic results of farms.
Environmental payments (€ m–3)
100
90
80
70
60
50%
40
30
20
10
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
1.
0
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
1.
5
1.
6
1.
7
1.
8
1.
9
2.
0
 Saved water % Irrigated UAA/Total UAA   
Figure 1. Reduction on water use and % irrigated UAA (utilized agricultural area) with increasing 
environmental payment level
Table 3. Impact of the environmental payments scenarios on cropping patterns for the whole 
study area
 
 MTR
1
Environmental payments 
(€ m–3)
0.10 0.30 0.50
Cereal and other field crops (COP) of which: 2,790 0.3 1.7 3.4
  Oats 382 8.0 16.6 22.2
  Durum wheat 2,310 1.7 3.5 4.7
  Maize 98 –64.4 –100.0 –100.0
Vegetable crops of which: 2,176 –5.9 –17.3 –27.9
  Watermelon 326 –10.8 –32.5 –54.1
  Melon 203 –10.3 –30.8 –51.3
  Tomato 1,010 –10.8 –32.5 –54.1
Fodder crops of which: 2,204 –0.2 –1.5 –3.2
  Irrigated 1,682 –0.7 –2.3 –2.7
  Non irrigated 522 1.7 3.5 4.6
Other crops 827 14.8 43.7 70.6
Irrigated land (ha) 2,397 –8.1 –20.3 –30.4
Water use (1000 m3) 5,949 –11.0 –26.0 –37.4
1 Simulation scenario referring to the mid-term review (MTR) reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy without environmental payments.
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The switch to non-irrigated crops causes an extensifica-
tion of cropping patterns that determines a reduction in 
farm revenues but also in specific variable costs. How-
ever, the farm gross margin increases if the environmen-
tal payments are taken into account. Viceversa, without 
environmental payments, the gross margin decreases due 
to the consistent reduction of the sales revenues.
Finally, it is important to note that the amount of pay-
ment per unit of irrigated land, even assuming a payment 
of € 0.50 m–3, still has a magnitude that is below the 
average environmental payments currently paid under 
the regional Rural Development Plan for irrigated crops 
(Table 5). However, given the expected limited partici-
pation to the proposed payment scheme, the overall fi-
nancial cost of the measure does not seem unsustainable 
from a financial point of view especially if the payment 
is set at € 0.30 m–3 or lower levels (Table 5). 
Discussion
This paper has analyzed the possible impact of in-
troducing environmental payments granted to farmers 
on the basis of the amount of water they save. This has 
been carried out by using an extension of the PMP 
Röhm and Dabbert approach that has allowed us to 
include DI crop techniques not observed in the refer-
ence period in the models. This inclusion is perceived 
as important in order to represent farmers’ behavior 
because they can adjust not only their cropping pat-
terns, but also the amount of water they use per unit of 
land. Indeed, while DI has been included in other kinds 
of mathematical programming models to account for 
this latter aspect (Reca et al., 2001), this analysis has 
done it in a PMP modeling framework.
This approach has been proposed in order to over-
come an important limitation of PMP by allowing a 
greater flexibility in model responses to changes in 
policy and economic conditions. A critical element of 
this approach is how to define the non-observed ac-
tivities. Our study uses agronomic growth models for 
this purpose. However, the interaction between agro-
nomic and economic models is not always straightfor-
ward, given that the former often assume full informa-
tion and technical efficiency (Dillon and Hardtacker, 
1993). Therefore, this process requires the careful in-
Table 4. Impact of the environmental payments on the amount of land where deficit irrigation 
techniques (DI5 and DI10) are used. Whole study area (ha)
 MTR1
Environmental payments 
(€ m–3)
0.10 0.30 0.50
Watermelon: Full irrigation 326 291 220 150 
  DI5 – – – –
  DI10 10 26 58 91 
Maize: Full irrigation 98 35 – –
  DI5 – – – –
  DI10 – – – –
Melon: Full irrigation 203 182 140 99 
  DI5 – – – –
  DI10 6 16 35 54 
Tomato: Full irrigation 1,010 901 682 464 
  DI5 – – – –
  DI10 28 76 171 267 
Total Full irrigation 1,637 1,408 1,043 712 
Total DI techniques 44 118 265 412 
Total irrigated 1,680 1,526 1,308 1,124 
Relative weight of deficit irrigation techniques (%)
  Full irrigation 97.4 92.3 79.8 63.4
  DI techniques  2.6  7.7 20.2 36.6
1 Simulation scenario referring to the Mid-term Review (MTR) reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy without environmental payments. DI5 and DI10 refer to reductions of irrigation water of 5% and 
10% with respect to current full irrigation techniques.
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tegration of data collected in the field with data derived 
from agronomic growth models.
The empirical analysis has permitted the testing of 
the proposed approach in the area of irrigation. How-
ever, this approach can be applied to a broader set of 
changes in production practices.
Furthermore, the empirical analysis has shown that, 
in the considered conditions, the introduction of envi-
ronmental payments generates a reduction in water use 
and in the amount of land devoted to irrigated crops, 
especially those with lower relative profitability such 
as corn. These results seem in line with those of em-
pirical studies conducted on the same topic on other 
study areas by means of farm-based mathematical 
programming models (Varela-Ortega, 2003). However, 
simulation results suggest a relatively low impact of 
the proposed scheme in terms of water saving at least 
for environmental payments of not too high levels. 
Indeed, environmental payments have been found to 
require a much higher public funding requirement than 
other policies in order to generate a relevant reduction 
of water use (Varela-Ortega, 2003).
The results suggest that, coherently with similar 
analysis (Bartolini et al., 2005), farmers’ demand for 
water is relatively rigid in the short-run. In the con-
sidered case, this is due to several factors among 
which the followings. First, the difference in profit-
ability between irrigated and rain-fed crops is large. 
Second, given the relatively small unitary water cost 
paid, the cost for irrigation water currently accounts 
for a very limited share of the variable specific crop 
costs (Table 1). Third, when the highest range of 
environmental payments is applied, a large share of 
the irrigated land is used to grow tree-crops (e.g. 
peaches) that the model keeps fixed at the base line 
level (Figure 1). 
When environmental payment level increases, the 
models substitute current full irrigation with DI tech-
niques. This behavior minimizes the reduction of the area 
used by irrigated crops that is caused by the decline of 
water use following the increase in the environmental 
payment level. This result supports the need to include 
DI techniques in the models to better depict technologi-
cal adjustments of farms and to provide more accurate 
estimations of the impact of important water policy 
changes that are expected to occur in the near future. 
Note that the techniques DI5 do not enter into pro-
duction. This is probably due to two reasons. First, the 
considered changes in per hectare water use are small 
and therefore these techniques are very similar to a 
linear combination of full irrigation and DI10. Second, 
our model seems to penalize the relative competitive-
ness of the intermediate (in this case the DI5) by intro-
ducing a large additional parameter to the linear aver-
age cost function for this group of techniques. Under 
the conditions represented in these scenarios, this could 
prevent DI5 from entering into production. However, 
this limitation could be overcome by taking into con-
sideration larger changes in per hectare water use and 
a larger number of alternative techniques. This could 
allow intermediate techniques to enter into production 
more easily.
The analysis has shown that the considered payments 
induce an improvement in farm economic results (i.e. 
gross margin with environmental payments). This oc-
curs because the payments more than compensate for 
the negative impact generated by the reduction of water 
use. The introduction of such environmental payments 
Table 5. Impact of the environmental payments on farm economic results for the whole study area
 MTR
1
(1,000 €)
Environmental payments (€ m–3)
0.10 0.30 0.50
% change with respect to MTR results
Sales revenues  17,894    –4.4    –12.5    –20.0
Specific variable costs   7,707    –4.9    –13.4    –20.9
CAP direct aids (coupled and decoupled aids)  5,370    –2.0      –1.7       3.1
Gross margin with CAP direct aids  8,704    –0.3     –2.0     –4.9
Gross margin with CAP direct aids and environmental payments  8,704     0.4      2.9      6.9
Environmental payments (1,000 €) – 64 429 1,031
Unitary environmental payments (€ ha–1 of irrigated land) – 29 225    618
Environmental payments/CAP direct aids (%) –     1.2      8.1     18.6
1 Simulation scenario referring to the mid-term review (MTR) reform of the Common Agricultural Policy without environmental pay-
ments.
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may be constrained by the amount of public resources 
that the EU and national governments are willing and 
able to allocate to agro-environmental schemes. How-
ever, it is important to remember that the Health Check 
reform of the CAP has generated two important chang-
es. On one hand it has increased the modulation rate 
that is going to reach 10% in 2012 (EC, 2009a). This 
will bring about an increase in the financial resources 
available for rural development policies including the 
agro-environmental ones. On the other hand, the Health 
Check has identified a limited set of new challenges 
for the EU agriculture to which such additional re-
sources should be devoted. One of the new challenges 
refers to water management in agriculture (EC, 2009b). 
These changes seem to suggest that the kind of envi-
ronmental payments considered in this paper may be-
come one of the likely instruments to pursue both water 
saving and income support objectives.
Note that the environmental payments are much 
lower than the CAP direct payments: even with a pay-
ment of € 0.50 m–3, environmental payments are around 
19% of the CAP direct payment. This reasoning sug-
gests that the shift of resources from CAP pillar I to 
pillar II measures could accommodate for the develop-
ment of additional and innovative environmental pay-
ments such as the one considered in this analysis.
Finally, the water saving could have a negative effect 
on the financial sustainability of the Irrigation Boards 
given that this reduces the overall amount of payments 
they collects from the farmers. Given that the service 
provided by the IBs is often characterized by some 
economies of scale, this could lead the IBs to increase 
the level of the unitary payment in order to ensure the 
balancing of their budget. This could have negative 
consequences on farm economic results and could in-
duce farmers to use other water sources (e.g. private 
wells) if available.
While the analysis of water-saving measures should 
be better addressed on a comparison of possible meas-
ures (Berbel et al., 2011), the proposed analysis seems 
to confirm that agro-environment payments could be a 
part of a more strategic approach to protecting water 
resources (EC, 2005).
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